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 We can say Ben is reading, but not BenÕs body is reading. The relational
account says that this is because our bodies are objects that do not read. On the
false-implication account, by contrast, to say BenÕs body is reading is to say that
Ben is reading, while implying, falsely, that reading is some sort of brute-physical
property. Besides being metaphysically neutral, this sort of view explains far
better why we cannot say such things as BenÕs mind is six feet tall. But neither
account explains why we cannot say BenÕs body is six feet tall. The article argues
that a variant of the false-implication account can solve this puzzle.
Here are some things we can say in ordinary circumstances:
Ben reads the Guardian.
Ben believes in God.
Ben is fond of newts.
Ben has a headache.
Ben is out for a walk.
And here are some things we cannot say:
*BenÕs body reads the Guardian.
*BenÕs body believes in God.
*BenÕs body is fond of newts.
*BenÕs body has a headache.
*BenÕs body is out for a walk.
There is something badly wrong with these statements. At best we might make
some of them in special contexts: We might say that BenÕs body was out for a
walk if he were sleepwalking. But even that would be a humorous and nonliteral
description.
More generally, it appears that we cannot attach to terms such as BenÕs body
any predicate that expresses or entails a mental property. We can say (in ordinary
circumstances) that someoneÕs body is F only if something can be F without being
conscious or intelligent. So we can say, for instance, that BenÕs body is composed
largely of oxygen, carbon, and hydrogen, because things entirely devoid of
mentality can have that composition. But we cannot say that BenÕs body is
2conscious or intelligent, or has any property that entails being conscious or
intelligent.
This rule applies to talk of animals as well as of people. We can say The lion
is hungry or The lion is stalking a gazelle, but we cannot say *The lionÕs body is
hungry or *The lionÕs body is stalking a gazelle. Nor is the phenomenon confined
to English: In an informal survey, native speakers have assured me that Czech,
Farsi, German, Hebrew, Italian, Mandarin, and Spanish have the same pattern of
usage.
Why is this? Why can we say, in ordinary contexts, that a person or an
animal has beliefs and preferences and sensations, or engages in purposeful
action, but not that a personÕs or an animalÕs body has or does these things?
The question is about the word body in the possessive sense Ñ not other uses of
the word. Body can mean simply physical object, as when we call the sun and
moon heavenly bodies, or in the notorious Òthree-body problemÓ (using NewtonÕs
laws to calculate the gravitational interactions among three or more massive
objects). My chair is a body in this sense, but it is not someoneÕs body. To be a
body in the possessive sense is to be the body of someone or something. (I am
unsure whether the term human body is possessive in this sense Ñ whether there
could be a human body that was never someoneÕs body.)
Sometimes we use the word body in a possessive but spatially restricted sense,
to mean something like torso Ñ as when we say that BenÕs extremities are tanned
but his body is pallid. This is not the sense at stake here either. That sense is
expressed in the sentence BenÕs extremities are tanned but  of his body is
pallid. I will call this sense possessive body talk.
Let us now turn to my question: Why can we say that Ben reads the Guardian but
not that his body does? Two sorts of answers have been proposed.
The first is that it is actually false that BenÕs body reads the Guardian. This
is the view of David Wiggins:
There is something absurd Ñ so unnatural that the upshot is simply falsity Ñ in
the proposition that peopleÕs bodies play chess, talk sense, know arithmetic, or
even play games or sit down. (1976: 152)
The reason it is false is that a person is one thing and her body is something else.
More precisely, peopleÕs bodies are things lacking in mental properties. ItÕs wrong
to say BenÕs body reads the Guardian because the expression BenÕs body refers to
something that does not and cannot read. Nor does it have beliefs or preferences,
or suffer pain. And although it can move in an ambulatory fashion, it cannot
actually walk, as walking is an intentional action and our bodies cannot have
3intentions. The same goes for the bodies of animals: we cannot say The lionÕs
body is stalking a gazelle because the phrase the lionÕs body refers to an object
that is incapable of intention and thus of action. It can only move in a way that
would be stalking were it the result of an appropriate intention on the part of the
lionÕs body.
To say that someoneÕs body is F, then, or that someone has an F body, is to
say that that person stands in a special relationship to a certain object, namely
her body. Having a muscular body is like having a muscular cousin, except that the
ownership relation we bear to our bodies is different from the one we bear to our
cousins. Because of its implication that possessive body talk asserts a relation
between the person (or animal) and something else, I will call it the relational
account of such talk.
The relational account suggests an explanation of another important feature
of possessive body talk, namely that we cannot speak of the bodies of chairs or
trees. Trees are bodies, we might say Ñ that is, material objects Ñ but they
cannot have bodies. We might call the trunk of a tree its ÒbodyÓ Ñ or more likely
Òthe body of the treeÓ Ñ but that would be the spatially restricted sense I set
aside earlier. More generally, we cannot speak of a thingÕs body unless that thing
has mental properties. Why should this be?
The relational account suggests that it is due to the nature of the body-
ownership relation. If a person (or animal) is one thing and her body is something
else, we can ask what makes something the body of a particular person (or
animal). What is it about the way I relate to a certain object that makes it my
body Ñ rather than your body, or no oneÕs? How should we complete the formula
Òx is yÕs body if and only if...x...y...Ó? A common answer is that my body is Òthe
vehicle of my agency in the world and my knowledge of the worldÓ (Swinburne
1984: 22; see also Shoemaker 1976). I move by moving my body, and perceive
by obtaining information from my bodyÕs sense organs. So what makes something
my body is roughly that I can move it just by intending to move, and can perceive
by means of it. Or perhaps my body is the largest such object: although I can
move my left hand just by intending to, and can perceive with it, it is not my
body, but only a part of it. If something like this is right, then a thing can have a
body only if it is capable of action and perception. That would explain why we
cannot speak of a thingÕs body unless it has mental properties, and thus why a
tree has no body. (Tye [1980: 181] proposes instead that xÕs body means roughly
the bearer of all the physical and spatio-temporal properties truly predicable of x
in ordinary language. This would appear to make it perfectly correct to speak of
the bodies of chairs or trees.)
The relational account has a striking metaphysical implication: that each
person or animal stands in some sort of ownership relation to a certain object,
namely her body. That object has all the physical properties we ordinarily attribute
to the person or animal whose body it is: It has, for instance, a normally
functioning nervous system and sense organs. Yet it is entirely devoid of mental
4properties. So the very meaning of the word body in the possessive sense implies
that these objects lack our mental properties. This makes it a contradiction in
terms to say that people are their bodies Ñ that a person and her body are one
and the same thing Ñ as it would follow that people Ñ that is, rational, conscious
beings Ñ have no mental properties. The relational account makes the word body
metaphysically loaded.
This need not imply that a person or animal is a nonphysical thing (or has a
nonphysical part), as substance dualists say Ñ though it is consistent with that
view. It may be that a person is a material thing with the same physical properties
as her body, but with mental properties as well. (This is apparently WigginsÕ own
view [1976: 153]; see also Shoemaker 1984: 113Ñ114) But either of these
would be significant and highly contentious claims.
The first Ñ the dualist view Ñ is normally taken to imply that it is absolutely
impossible for any material thing to have any mental property. (If any material
thing could have mental properties, normal, healthy human bodies would have
them.) The second has an even more surprising implication: that a thingÕs physical
properties are never sufficient to give it mental properties. More strongly, there
are beings physically identical to us but without any conscious awareness or other
mental features. Philosophers of mind call such beings ÒzombiesÓ (Kirk 2015,
Olson forthcoming). And although there is controversy over the logical possibility
of such zombies Ñ whether they could exist if the laws of nature were different,
say Ñ no one believes that there actually are any.
Both alternatives raise the difficult question of why the objects we call our
bodies cannot have mental properties. What prevents them from using their brains
to think? This question must have an answer. The relational account tells us
nothing about what it might be.
Now I stated the relational account as the view that the phrase BenÕs body
refers to a physical object lacking mental properties, making it wrong to say BenÕs
body reads the Guardian because BenÕs body is something that cannot read. But
someone could say instead that it sounds wrong simply because BenÕs body refers
to something that we believe to lack mental properties. We all have a deeply held
conviction that our bodies cannot read. Even those who are strongly opposed to
the metaphysical implications just discussed Ñ substance dualism and the
existence of zombies Ñ have the conviction. Otherwise they would find it
perfectly appropriate to say BenÕs body reads the Guardian; yet this sounds wrong
to everyone. But for all that, the conviction could be mistaken. Perhaps our bodies
really can read. We may even be our bodies. This variant of the relational account
would have no troubling metaphysical implications. It would imply only that we all
accept a claim with those implications. The difference between these two variants
is unimportant for present purposes. I will stick with the first, but everything I
have to say could easily be adapted to fit the second.
5The relational account says that BenÕs body reads the Guardian is wrong because
BenÕs body refers to an object other than Ben that cannot read. (Or, alternatively,
it sounds wrong because that phrase refers to something that we all believe
cannot read.) The statement is false in the way that BenÕs chair reads the
Guardian is false. The second explanation says that the phrase BenÕs body refers
to Ben himself. But it refers to him in a way that implies or suggests or otherwise
indicates something about the attached predicate or the property it expresses. An
utterance of BenÕs body reads the Guardian does two things. First, it says that
Ben reads the Guardian. And second, it makes a comment about the status of
reading the Guardian. The comment is roughly that reading the Guardian is some
sort of brute-physical property. So the reason it is wrong, in ordinary
circumstances, to say BenÕs body reads the Guardian is not that BenÕs body is
something that cannot read, but that reading the Guardian is not a brute-physical
property.
Referring to Ben as BenÕs body is a bit like referring to a house as a pile of
stones. It may be that any stone house literally is a pile of stones; but to refer to
it in that way is to imply or suggest that it is in a poor state of repair. It would be
wrong, in ordinary circumstances, to call a house in perfect condition a pile of
stones not because it isnÕt one, but because the description suggests falsely that
the house is falling down.
So we can say in ordinary circumstances BenÕs body is composed largely of
oxygen, carbon, and hydrogen, because having that composition is a brute-
physical property; but we cannot say BenÕs body believes in God, is fond of newts,
has a headache, or is out for a walk, because those are not brute-physical
properties.
Jay Rosenberg has given an account of this sort. He contrasts it with the
relational account by saying that possessive body talk
does not serve the function of indicating a special subject, a non-person, to
which certain properties are to be attributed, but rather serves the function of
making a comment about certain properties which are attributed to the person
himself, namely that they are not exclusively properties of persons (or of living
organisms). (1998: 73; see also Rosenberg 1983: 48f-58)
And I have said something similar myself (Olson 1997: 152Ñ153, 2006:
257Ñ258). So the proposal is that statements such as BenÕs body reads the
Guardian are wrong not because they refer to an object Ñ someoneÕs body Ñ that
cannot read, but because they carry the false implication that reading is a certain
sort of brute-physical property. Call this the false-implication account of
possessive body talk.
Whether this would make such statements false, or merely inappropriate or
misleading, depends on the nature of the implication. It could be that in saying
6that BenÕs body is F, we are actually saying (among other things) that being F is a
brute-physical property, or something that entails this. In that case the statement
would be false. But the implication could be weaker. I might say that BenÕs body is
F, rather than simply that Ben is, in order to get you to think that being F is a
brute-physical property, much as I might refer to BenÕs house as a pile of stones
in order to get you to think that itÕs a ruin. Yet it may be that while I have
suggested that being F is brute physical, all I have actually said is that Ben is F. So
the false-implication account comes in two versions, depending on whether the
statement that someoneÕs body is F entails that being F is a brute-physical
property or whether it only suggests it in some way. I donÕt know which version is
better, and I will set the point aside.
What counts as a brute-physical property Ñ a property of the sort that we
use possessive body talk to call attention to? Rosenberg says it is one that
inanimate objects can have. To say that someoneÕs body is F implies that being F
is a property that such things as sticks and stones can have Ñ objects that are
not people or living organisms (1998: 68). But this seems too restrictive. It is
perfectly natural to say that BenÕs body absorbs nutrients through the wall of the
intestine, or is healthy or diseased, even though these are not properties that
inanimate objects can have. A better suggestion might be that brute-physical
properties are those that a thing can have without having any mental properties.
A thing cannot read, or be fond of newts, or go for a walk or sit down, without
having mental properties, but it can still absorb nutrients through the wall of the
intestine or be healthy or diseased. That is what makes it wrong to say that BenÕs
body reads or is fond of newts or is out for a walk, and acceptable to say that his
body is healthy or diseased or composed largely of oxygen, carbon, and hydrogen.
What about the fact that we cannot speak of the chairÕs or the treeÕs body?
The false-implication account suggests that this is because chairs and trees
cannot have mental properties (and we all know this), and so there is no point in
indicating that a property we are attributing to them is brute physical. There is a
point in calling attention to the distinction between brute-physical and other
properties when speaking of people or animals, but not when speaking of chairs or
trees.
The false-implication account has two important advantages over the relational
account. First, it has no contentious metaphysical implications. It does not imply
that each person stands in an ownership relation to an object having all the
physical properties we attribute to the person in ordinary circumstances yet
without mental properties.
You might think it implies that people are physical things Ñ things having
the properties expressed by the predicates we can appropriately attach to such
terms as BenÕs body in ordinary contexts. If the expression BenÕs body refers to
Ben, the thought would go, then Ben must be his body; and surely BenÕs body is a
7physical thing. That our bodies are made up largely of oxygen, carbon, and
hydrogen would imply that we ourselves made up of those elements. And this is a
contentious metaphysical claim, even if it is nowadays more widely held than
substance dualism.
But none of this follows from the false-implication account. The account is
entirely consistent with the view that Ben and other human people are nonphysical
entities Ñ Cartesian immaterial substances or the like. Suppose we can say truly,
in ordinary contexts, that BenÕs body is visible, and that being visible is a brute-
physical property. (ItÕs a property that stones have.) To say that BenÕs body is
visible, on the false-implication account, is to say that Ben is visible, with the
implication that being visible is a brute-physical property. Yet this does not imply
that Ben actually has the property of being visible Ñ which, I suppose, only
physical things can have. At most it follows that we can truly say in ordinary
contexts that Ben is visible. And this appears compatible with his being wholly
immaterial. That is in fact the view of those who take Ben to be immaterial. When
they are discussing metaphysics, they will say that we are immaterial and thus not
visible. Yet in ordinary contexts the right thing to say, whatever metaphysical
theory we may hold, is that we are all visible (and thus unlikely to sneak unnoticed
past the bouncer). Substance dualists simply believe that what makes the ordinary
statement that Ben is visible true is that his body Ñ the vehicle of his agency and
his knowledge of the world Ñ is a visible material thing. This is all consistent with
the false-implication account. The account is metaphysically neutral.
The second advantage of the false-implication account is that it suggests
an answer to a related puzzle about the use of terms such as mind in a possessive
sense. Here are some things we can say in ordinary circumstances:
Ben weighs 170 pounds.
Ben is out for a walk.
Ben is restless and inquiring.
BenÕs mind is restless and inquiring.
And here are some things we cannot say:
*BenÕs mind weighs 170 pounds.
*BenÕs mind is out for a walk.
More generally, it appears that we cannot attach to expressions such as BenÕs
mind any predicate that expresses or entails a physical property. We can say in
ordinary circumstances that someoneÕs mind is F only if being F is a certain sort
of mental property.
Why is this? An analogue of the relational account would say that for
someoneÕs mind to be F, or for her to have an F mind, is for her to stand in a
special relationship to a certain object Ñ her mind Ñ that is F. Having an inquiring
8mind is like having an inquiring cousin, except that the ownership relation we bear
to our minds is different from the one we bear to our cousins. So a person is one
thing and her mind is something else. WhatÕs more, peopleÕs minds are things
lacking in physical properties. So the reason itÕs wrong to say that BenÕs mind
weighs 170 pounds, or is tall and thin, is that the expression BenÕs mind refers to
something that has no weight or size or shape. It has only certain mental
properties, such as being restless and inquiring (and mental properties are not a
species of physical properties). BenÕs mind is a wholly nonphysical thing.
There are of course metaphysicians who believe that each of us does stand
in a special relationship to a wholly nonphysical entity that has mental properties
such as being conscious or intelligent or inquiring or active. But no one would take
this pattern of linguistic usage to be evidence in support of that view. No one ever
argues for substance dualism on the grounds that we cannot say in ordinary
circumstances that BenÕs mind weighs 170 pounds. A relational account of
Òpossessive mind talkÓ is hopeless.
A far better explanation is that to speak of someoneÕs mind is to ascribe a
certain property to her and to imply or suggest that it is a certain sort of mental
property. To say BenÕs mind is restless and inquiring is to say that Ben is restless
and inquiring and to indicate that being restless and inquiring are mental
properties. (We donÕt mean that he is physically restless Ñ that he cannot sit still,
say.) BenÕs mind, in ordinary language (as opposed to metaphysics), means more
or less the same as BenÕs intellect Ñ a term that no one would take to refer to a
thinking being. This account is metaphysically neutral. And it is precisely
analogous to the false-implication account of possessive body talk.
Exactly what sort of mental properties we use the expression BenÕs mind to
indicate is a difficult question. We cannot say that BenÕs mind is fond of newts or
has a headache. They have to be cognitive or intellectual properties. But not just
any cognitive or intellectual properties: We canÕt say that BenÕs mind knows the
times tables up to thirteen, or has forgotten to feed the dog. Sometimes we use
the expression with predicates expressing character traits: We say that BenÕs
mind is sharp, subtle, methodical, or active. And sometimes we use it to indicate
that someone accepts a certain claim in an abstract, intellectual way but is
prevented by his emotions from embracing it fully: My mind knows that flying is
safe, yet I canÕt board a plane without breaking into a cold sweat. (No doubt there
are other sorts of cases as well.) All of this is compatible with the general claim
that to say that someoneÕs mind is F is to say that that person is F, while implying
or suggesting something about the nature of being F.
Despite its attractions, however, the false-implication account is not right as it
stands. It tells us that to say that BenÕs body is F is to say that Ben is F, with the
implication that being F is a brute-physical property: roughly one that does not
entail any mental properties. It follows that we can say that BenÕs body is F
9(where being F is a brute-physical property) just when we can say that Ben is F.
So we should be able to attach predicates expressing brute-physical properties
(brute-physical predicates for short) to either Ben or BenÕs body indifferently.
But this is not so. Here, once again, are some things we can say in ordinary
circumstances:
Ben is six feet tall.
Ben weighs 170 pounds.
Ben has the flu.
Ben is upstairs.
BenÕs body has a surface area of 1.7 square metres.
BenÕs body has a total water content of around 40 litres.
The amount of fluid in BenÕs body varies throughout the day.
When wet, BenÕs body has an electrical resistance of around 300 ohms.
And here are some things we cannot say:
*BenÕs body is six feet tall.
*BenÕs body weighs 170 pounds.
*BenÕs body has the flu.
*BenÕs body is upstairs.
*Ben has a surface area of 1.7 square metres.
*Ben has a total water content of around 40 litres.
*The amount of fluid in Ben varies throughout the day.
*When wet, Ben has an electrical resistance of around 300 ohms.
Some of these can be said in special circumstances. We might say that BenÕs
body is upstairs if Ben is dead. And philosophers may say such things in discussing
metaphysics: Richard Swinburne, for instance, writes, ÒA manÕs body is that to
which his physical properties belong. If a man weighs ten stone then his body
weighs ten stoneÓ (1997: 145). But no one would say these things in ordinary
circumstances. They sound odd, if not wrong. Yet all the predicates involved are
indisputably brute physical. In fact relatively few brute-physical predicates can be
attached to Ben and to BenÕs body indifferently: is healthy, perhaps, burns 3000
calories a day, or has a temperature of 36.4L C. Again, very similar patterns of
usage are found in Czech, Farsi, German, Hebrew, Italian, Mandarin, and Spanish.
So some brute-physical predicates are what we might call Òexclusively
personalÓ, in that we can attach them to personal names such as Ben but not to
terms such as BenÕs body: is six feet tall, weighs 170 pounds, has the flu, and is
upstairs, for instance. Others exhibit the opposite pattern of usage, and can be
attached to terms such as BenÕs body but not to Ben: has a surface area of 1.7
square metres, has a water content of 40 litres, and the like. Call them
Òexclusively bodilyÓ.A smaller number are neutral: neither exclusively personal nor
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exclusively bodily.
The false-implication account as I have stated it cannot account for this
fact. Consider exclusively personal predicates such as is six feet tall. The account
tells us that to say that BenÕs body is six feet tall (in ordinary circumstances) is to
say that Ben is six feet tall while indicating that being six feet tall is a brute-
physical property. It is clearly appropriate to say, in ordinary circumstances, that
Ben is six feet tall (supposing that that is his actual height); and being six feet tall
is a brute-physical property. So it ought to be equally appropriate to say that
BenÕs body is six feet tall. And the same goes for the other cases. There should be
no exclusively personal brute-physical properties at all.
Now consider an exclusively bodily predicate: has a surface area of 1.7
square metres, say. Since it too is clearly brute physical, the only reason why it
could be wrong to say that Ben has that surface area, on the false-implication
account, would be if he did not have the property. And the same would go for any
other surface area. It would follow that a person cannot have a surface area, or
any other property expressed by an exclusively bodily predicate. People could not
be material things. That would deprive the false-implication view of its
metaphysical neutrality.
So the false-implication account cannot be right as it stands. But this is no
reason to prefer the relational account. It implies that the expression BenÕs body
refers to an object having properties of the sort expressed by exclusively bodily
and neutral predicates, but no properties expressed by exclusively personal
predicates. So BenÕs body would have a surface area and a water content but no
height or weight or location; it could be healthy or diseased but could not have
any specific ailment such as flu. No one would say that. This looks like a decisive
objection to the relational account.
I think a variant of the false-implication account might solve the second puzzle.
Suppose that to say, in ordinary circumstances, that BenÕs body is F is to say that
Ben is F, with the implication that being F is a brute-physical property of a special
sort: roughly an unfamiliar one. We can say that BenÕs body has a surface area of
1.7 square metres or contains 40 litres of water because these are properties
discussed only in scientific contexts (as well as being brute physical). We cannot
ordinarily say that BenÕs body is six feet tall or weighs 170 pounds or is upstairs
because, although these too are brute-physical properties, they are familiar to
everyone and not discussed only in science. By contrast, it seems acceptable to
say that BenÕs body has a mass of 77.11kg, employing a predicate we expect to
issue only from the mouth of someone wearing a lab coat.
Or at least this holds for exclusively bodily predicates, which we can attach
to BenÕs body but not to Ben. Neutral predicates that can be attached to either
term indifferently are not usually unfamiliar or confined to scientific contexts.
What about the fact that it sounds wrong to say that Ben has a surface
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area of 1.7 square metres or contains 40 litres of water? The false-implication
view says nothing about this. It is only an account of terms such as BenÕs body,
and is silent about what predicates we can attach to peopleÕs names.
Here the rule appears to be the obverse of the one governing possessive
body talk. We can attach brute-physical predicates to Ben just when they are in
some way familiar: is six feet tall, weighs 170 pounds, is upstairs, and so on.
Predicates such as has a surface area of 1.7 square metres and contains 40 litres
of water express properties we donÕt normally think of ourselves as having. They
are, we might say, alienating. We know they have something to do with us Ñ they
pertain to us in some way or other Ñ but we think of them as somehow less close
to us than familiar physical properties such as height and weight. We want to hold
them at armÕs length. We express this sense of distance by putting them in the
idiom of possessive body talk: by attaching them not to Ben, but to BenÕs body.
More generally, there are a variety of brute-physical predicates that we use
in describing ourselves (and other animals). The more familiar such a predicate is
Ñ the more commonplace in ordinary, nonscientific talk Ñ the more ready we are
to use it ÒdirectlyÓ Ñ that is, to attach it to personal terms such as Ben. The less
familiar it is Ñ the more it is confined to scientific contexts Ñ the more alienated
we feel, and the more likely we are to use it ÒindirectlyÓ by attaching it only to
possessive body terms. The neutral predicates, such as is healthy, are those in
the middle of the spectrum, which we can thus use in both ways. Because they
are in some sense scientific terms, we can attach them to BenÕs body, but
because they are also familiar, we can attach them equally to Ben.
That is my best attempt to explain the peculiar way in which we use
possessive body (and mind) talk. The account can no doubt be improved, but it
looks like the right sort of thing. And I am pleased to say that it has no troubling
metaphysical implications.
It does, however, have an interesting linguistic implication. It implies that all
ordinary uses of terms such as BenÕs body are eliminable. We can always replace
ordinary statements of the form BenÕs body is F with something like Ben is F, and
being F is an unfamiliar brute-physical property without loss of propositional
content. And the same goes for BenÕs mind: We can replace ordinary statements
of the form BenÕs mind is F with something like Ben is F, and being F is a cognitive
property of such-and-such a sort without loss of propositional content. In saying
that this holds for ordinary statements I exclude poetry, jokes, and discussions of
metaphysics. Whether such terms as BenÕs body and BenÕs mind have a legitimate
role in metaphysics, where they are not eliminable in this way, is a large question
that I cannot discuss here Ñ though for what itÕs worth I think the answer is No
(on this point I recommend van Inwagen 1980).
I thank Jenny Saul, Karsten Witt, and Hongbing Yu for comments on earlier
versions.
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